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Abstract:  
The introductory article to the special issue highlights the progression of comparative and EU 
interest group studies towards a field characterized by the systematic empirical testing of 
propositions derived from mid-range theories. Locating the special issue in this research field 
it argues that the study of national interest organizations in EU policy-making sheds light on a 
theoretically and empirically neglected research subject. It further demonstrates that the 
individual articles present novel developments in the study of political alignments among 
interest groups and political institutions, the Europeanization of domestic interest 
organizations, and the question of bias in interest group populations. Thereafter, it gives an 
overview of the individual contributions. Finally, it indicates that the special issue does not 
only contribute to the comparative study of interest groups, but also to the analysis of EU 
policy-making, multilevel governance, and political representation in the EU. 
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Recent developments in the study of interest groups 
Almost 20 years ago, Baumgartner and Leech (1998) suggested in their review of American 
interest group studies that these were highly fragmented, filled only a research niche, and 
needed to be empirically broadened and connected with other areas in political science. 10 
years later, Beyers, Eising and Maloney (2008) initiated a West European Politics special 
issue on the study of interest groups in Comparative Politics and European Union (EU) 
studies based on the understanding that the study of interest group systems is crucial to the 
understanding of the functioning of advanced democracies and multilevel governance in 
Europe. While confirming that interest group research formed a niche area within political 
science in which a variety of different research subjects co-exist, they also pointed to the 
growth of academic interest in group politics. Taking stock almost ten years ahead, we can 
observe a remarkable transformation in the study of the interest representation in both Europe 
and the United States.  
 
While still forming a distinct research area with specific research concepts and mid-range 
theories, the field broadened to build stronger links with scholarship on public opinion (e.g. 
Rasmussen et al. 2014) and political parties (e.g. Allern and Bale 2012) as well as legislative 
politics (e.g. Dür et al. 2015) and policy studies (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2009). At the same 
time, the empirical scope of interest group studies widened from a focus on small-N studies to 
large-N research to develop broader empirical and more reliable theoretical generalizations 
(e.g. Bunea and Baumgartner 2014; Eising 2016). Moreover, modular research projects were 
designed to integrate insights on major facets of interest group politics: mobilization, 
organization, strategies, influence, population, and bias (e.g. Beyers et al. 2014; Binderkrantz 
et al. 2015). Lowery et al. (2015: 1228) suggest that ‘the transatlantic community of scholars 
now broadly shares a common methodological approach to a core set of mid-range theories on 
interest representation’. Most studies now integrate into their research designs as explanatory 
factors the properties of groups and their members, institutional contexts, and issue 
characteristics. They reaffirmed the importance of studying interest groups in the European 
Union and in liberal democracies. 
 
The recent literature scrutinized both established concepts and theories and ventured into 
new areas, each on the basis of large sets of observations. Following Olson’s (1965) logic of 
collective action, some studies looked into the mobilization of different types of interests and 
their effects on lobbying behaviour and success (e.g. Beyers and Kerremans 2007; 
Binderkrantz et al 2015). While Olson (1965: 49-50) distinguished among intermediate and 
privileged groups on the one hand, and large, latent groups, on the other, today’s studies tend 
to separate among groups for specific interests and groups for diffuse interests. Usually, they 
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relate business interests to specific interests which are said to be easier to mobilize, and 
citizen interests to diffuse interests that are more difficult to mobilize. Recent studies confirm 
that such group types are major determinants of interest group strategy (Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007; Dür and Mateo 2016). Their findings often connect the interests of a group 
(specific versus diffuse) with its strategic choices, with business representatives as exemplary 
users of inside tactics (aimed at contacting decision-makers) and citizen groups as typical 
users of outside tactics (aimed at mobilizing the public). Further studies (e.g. Dür and De 
Bièvre 2007) suggest an advantage of specific interests in the generation of resources. They 
show that specific interests tend to be richer in resources than diffuse interests, because their 
membership consists of comparatively well-endowed firms. Companies as members tend to 
spend more money on the representation of interests than individual citizens as members of 
NGOs. Rasmussen (2015) also points to group unity as a precondition for interest group 
success. 
 
All studies explicitly define and measure core concepts in interest group studies such as 
mobilization, access, and success. While the evidence on the relation between group type and 
organizational resources on access is quite consistent, there is lesser consensus on how they 
are related to the success (or preference attainment) of interest organizations and their 
influence on policy outcomes. Most studies provide evidence that a greater resource 
endowment of an organization furthers its access to decision-makers (Dür and Mateo 2016; 
Eising 2007; Klüver 2011; but see Beyers and Kerremans 2007). The common wisdom is that 
specific interests tend also to win over diffuse interests in public policy-making (see Lowery 
et al. 2015). That this is not always true and hinges upon several conditions has not only been 
shown in Vogel’s (1989, 1995) analyses of business’ fluctuating fortunes and the California 
and Delaware effects in environmental and consumer protection regulation. Recent studies 
also confirm that specific interests do not always win in EU legislative politics and that many 
policy outcomes are closer to the preferences of citizen groups than to those of business 
interest associations (Dür et al. 2015). Studies taking into account the resource endowment of 
interest organization indicate, with respect to the US context, that more resources are neither 
significantly associated with greater success nor with more influence (Baumgartner et al. 
2009).  
 
Both studies highlight that interest groups’ success depends heavily on the responsiveness 
of policy-makers to their demands. A comparison of their findings points to the intervening 
role of institutional contexts. While Dür et al’s (2015) study allows for the interpretation that 
the structural power of business is frequently insufficient to keep market and social regulation 
off the EU’s policy-making agenda, Baumgartner et al. (2009) argue that the policy status quo 
in the United States (US) reflects the institutionalization of bias and is therefore difficult to 
change. Moreover, as proposal initiation is ‘relatively easy’, only ‘few bills actually become 
law’ in US federal legislation (Mahoney 2008: 66-67). Accordingly, when the European 
Commission initiates legislation, policy change is more likely to come about than in the case 
of federal bills in the US. This has important implications for interest group mobilization. In 
the EU, interest groups are more likely to mobilize in order to defend the policy status quo or 
to propose alternatives to the policy proposal than in the US (Eising et al., in this issue), 
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where interest groups in favour of the status quo are more inclined to lean back (Baumgartner 
et al. 2009).  
 
Several studies refer explicitly to factors located in national and EU level institutional 
contexts (e.g. Eising 2007; Klüver et al. 2015). Studies incorporating national institutions 
distinguish commonly between the classic categories of pluralism and corporatism (e.g. 
Schneider et al. 2007) or measure as a variety thereof the degree of political-economic 
integration (Siaroff 1999). Findings show that interest organizations have lobbying styles 
conforming to the interest mediation system they come from, but that they also adapt to the 
institutional setting they are active in (e.g. Binderkrantz 2003). Other national contexts refer 
to socio-economic characteristics, the duration of EU membership, ideological orientations of 
the governing parties, varieties of capitalism in terms of coordinated and liberal market 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001) or welfare states in the form of liberal, conservative or 
social-democratic welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Although findings differ in some 
ways, one aspect has been shown by several scholars: lobbying strategies of interest groups 
vary based on their domestic experiences and institutional settings. The contributions in this 
special issue corroborate the continuing relevance of domestic contexts for the behaviour of 
domestic interest groups in EU policy-making.  
 
Regarding the EU institutional context, several studies indicated that the demand for 
information (Bouwen 2002) and the supply of information (Chalmers 2013) vary across EU 
decision-making institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
EU Council. Some studies point also to differences within these institutions such as among 
the Directorate Generals (DG) of the European Commission because of their varying 
competencies and regulatory approaches in different policy domains (e.g. Eising and Kohler-
Koch 1994). A core expectation in that regard is that different policy fields attract varying 
levels of interest group attention (Coen and Katsaitis 2013; see also Berkhout et al. 2017, in 
this issue). In addition, several authors studied the consultation practices of the European 
institutions with regard to the presence and activity of interest groups (e.g. Gornitzka and 
Sverdrup 2008; Klüver 2011), finding that the impact of interest groups varies along the 
extent of EU competencies in different policy areas. Several authors refer to this as the 
‘degree of regulatory exposure’. In particular, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) provided 
evidence that firms acting in industries highly affected by EU regulation are more likely to 
lobby both directly and collectively at the European level. 
 
With respect to issue characteristics, we find the following: Taking Lowi’s classical 
differentiation between distributive and regulatory issues (Lowi 1972), researchers expect 
business interests to gain more from lobbying when distributive issues are discussed since 
there might be less opposition on them than on regulatory issues (Dür and Mateo 2016). Other 
differentiations include complex issues versus simple ones, or conflictual and salient issues 
(Mahoney 2008: 40-41). Issues that are salient to the public attract more stakeholders and 
increase the possibility of building large lobbying coalitions. Klüver (2011) finds that salience 
does not have a constant effect on lobbying success but that the more interest groups act on 
one ‘policy side’ (Baumgartner et al. 2009) of a salient issue, the more successful they are 
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(see also Kreutler 2014: 175). On highly conflictual issues, interest groups have directly 
contradictory positions such that striking a compromise and reaching a common position 
between them seems to be impossible (Mahoney 2008: 74). Mahoney (2008: 40) adds that the 
scope of issues also matters: niche and sector related issues allow individual interest groups 
greater leverage than issues with a larger scope. Her findings correspond with Culpepper’s 
notion of ‘quiet politics’: The narrower an issue is and the less the public cares about it, the 
more managerial organizations will be able ‘to exercise disproportionate influence over the 
rules governing that issue’ (Culpepper 2011: 177). Rasmussen (2015) yields a similar finding 
with respect to the involvement of business groups in EP committee amendments on incoming 
EU legislation. 
 
Despite the dynamic development of interest group studies, there are a number of 
controversial, unresolved and unaddressed issues that remain. Many studies concentrate on 
EU level interest representation and EU level organizations. It is less common to study the 
role of domestic groups in EU politics. This is surprising because these do not just present 
their positions on EU policies routinely to national governments. A large number of them 
have joined EU level groups and are also well represented in the governance structures of 
these organizations. And even though the EU institutions’ consultation bodies are still biased 
towards EU level groups (Rasmussen and Gross 2015), many national interest organizations 
participate in the Commission’s online consultations and present their interests directly to the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. Previous research suggests that the EU 
institutions depend especially on national interest groups to learn about the member states’ 
‘domestic encompassing interest[s]’ (Bouwen 2002). Empirical studies covering national 
interest groups as actors in EU politics confirm that differences in national and EU contexts, 
organizational features, and issue characteristics matter to the representation of interests in the 
EU’s multilevel system (Knodt et al. 2011; Bunea and Baumgartner 2014; Klüver et al. 
2015), thus the lack of more nuanced studies is surprising especially with regard to venue 
shopping and its determinants. The study of alignments, i.e. the analysis of the positional and 
ideological proximity between decision-makers and interest groups is missing, except for 
analyses looking at the European Parliament (Rasmussen 2015; Beyers et al. 2015) or the US 
context (e.g. Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). The national perspective on this topic in the EU 
multilevel system is yet unexplored. Finally, the participation of Southern and Eastern 
European interest groups in EU policy-making has received fairly little attention (see Cekik 
2017, in this issue). 
 
The Contribution of this Special Issue 
The contributions to this special issue (see also table 1) move the research on national interest 
organizations in the EU forward by addressing some of these gaps and controversies. The 
articles show that the challenge of multilevel interest representation affects the national 
interest organizations’ strategies, organizational structures, relations with national 
parliaments, governments, and media, their collaboration with EU umbrella organizations and 
EU institutions and in the end their possibilities to influence policy-making. They draw a 
comprehensive picture of multilevel governance and the policy process in the EU. Addressing 
Lowery et al’s (2015: 1128) concern that ‘we do very little actual comparison’ in interest 
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group studies, most articles (e.g. Berkhout et al 2017, Carroll and Rasmussen 2017, Cekik 
2017, Eising et al 2017, Kohler-Koch et al. 2017, Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, Tatham 
2017; all in this issue) broaden the predominant research design of studies on EU interest 
representation by connecting multilevel analyses with the comparative study of member state 
contexts. The contributions vary in their coverage of EU level and national level institutions, 
respectively. 
 
ABOUT HERE: Table 1 
 
As the EU policy process attracts the attention of a great number and variety of actors (see 
Beyers et al. 2008), the articles cover not only organized interest groups in a narrow sense 
(i.e. organized associations) but include also firms, institutions, regions, research institutes, or 
think tanks. They balance the study of organizations from all EU member states with in-depth 
analyses of organizations rooted in selected EU member states. A few contributions focus on 
particular categories of actors (business associations, Kohler- Koch et al 2017; large firms, 
Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; and regions, Tatham 2017, all in this issue), while most 
analyse different types of organizations participating in EU policy-making or present in 
national and EU populations of interest groups (Berkhout et al. 2017, Carroll and Rasmussen 
2017, both in this issue). All authors conceptualize national contexts and analyse their effects 
on interest representation. They assess the importance of potentially important factors such as 
the level of economic prosperity, the duration of EU membership, the mode of national 
interest mediation, the associability of domestic civil society, the difference between EU 
member states and candidate countries, party ideologies, etc. Several look also into how issue 
contexts impact on the lobbying activities of domestic interest organizations (e.g. Cekik 2017, 
Eising et al. 2017, Wonka 2017, all in this issue), studying the Europeanization of policies, 
the type of policy, distinguishing among new and recast proposals (which explicitly aim at 
amending and replacing existing legislative acts in the EU) as well as among substantial 
policy areas such as banking and environmental policy, etc. 
 
The contributions yield a number of new insights. In particular, they shed new light on 
three major research topics: (1) the alignments between interest groups and policy-makers, (2) 
the Europeanization and access of interest groups in new EU member states and candidate 
countries, and (3) the existence of bias in interest group populations.  
 
(1) Several contributions (see below) focus on the alignments between interest groups and 
political institutions. In this emergent research area, they present different ways of 
conceptualizing and measuring such alignments. Connecting with the literature on 
political parties, they emphasize the importance of ideological alignments with 
national members of parliament (Wonka 2017, in this issue) and national governments 
(Eising et al. 2017, in this issue) to account for the venues of domestic groups. The 
importance of such alignments shows in the earlier finding that a close ideological fit 
with EP committee members made it easier for business representatives to leave their 
fingerprints on the committees regulating industrial affairs and for environmental 
groups to do so on the environment, public affairs and health committee (Rasmussen 
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2015). Beyond ideological alignments, the contributions showcase the relevance of 
positional alignments and of domestic and EU level conflicts for venue seeking 
activities of large firms (Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, in this issue) and interest 
organizations in the EU multilevel system (Eising et al. 2017, in this issue). They also 
underline the relevance of positional alignments among EU level interest groups and 
their national members for the latters’ strategic choices outside the EU level groups, 
i.e. their use of ‘selective exit’ (Eising 2017, in this issue). Despite using different 
theories, concepts and measurements, all studies reach the conclusion that ideological 
and positional alignments impact on the venues of domestic interest groups.  
 
(2)  A number of contributions add to the debate on how the EU affects state and none-
state stakeholders in the EU member states and also outside the EU. Contributing to 
the study of the EU’s impact on domestic actors, structures, and processes, they 
confirm that such Europeanization can work in two ways, namely top-down and 
bottom-up (Börzel and Risse 2007). Several articles emphasize the top-down 
perspective and highlight the adaptation of domestic interest organizations to the EU 
multilevel context: Expanding beyond the EU borders, Cekik (2017, in this issue) 
focuses on how the EU affects national interest groups and practices of interest 
mediation in accession countries. She informs readers on interest group populations in 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, their membership in EU organizations and on 
how the EU shapes domestic structures in third countries. Surprisingly, she finds that 
there is no great difference regarding the Europeanisation of business and civil society 
interests in these three countries which she attributes to the organizations’ resource 
dependency structures and EU sponsorship of diffuse interests. She highlights that the 
accession countries have interest group systems that are distinct from those in the 
more established Western European member states. Kohler-Koch et al. (2017, in this 
issue) scrutinize how national business associations in four countries adapt their access 
strategies to the EU multilevel system. By widening established models of the logic of 
access in EU policy-making, the authors demonstrate that the Europeanization of 
business interests follows fairly similar patterns across countries. Resources, 
representativeness, and cross-sectoral scope matter in all national business systems. 
Furthermore, they conclude from their cross-national comparison that Central 
European, i.e. Polish, business groups do not adapt less well in terms of their access to 
domestic and EU institutions than their Western European counterparts. Tatham 
(2017, in this issue) adds important findings on the regional offices in Brussels in 
terms of the activities they perform within the EU level environment. Like the articles 
in the first section, he scrutinizes the relevance of parties and party ideologies. He 
shows that even major party-political differences between regional and national 
governments do not leave much of an imprint on the activities of the regional offices 
in Brussels. This deviant finding – compared to those in the first section – may be due 
to the tighter coupling between regions and central governments than between 
domestic interest groups and national (government) parties, but may also result from 
focusing on the activity levels and general roles (as networkers, fund hunters, 
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intermediaries, or policy players) of the regional offices in Brussels rather than on the 
regions’ usage of venues at different levels. 
 
(3) Employing frameworks rooted in the study of population ecology, two contributions 
tackle the question of bias in the EU interest group population. This classic subject in 
interest group research raises a fundamental question for democratic political orders: 
Are some interests more strongly reflected in government decisions than others? It has 
drawn increasing attention in the study of interest representation in the EU in recent 
years (e.g. Beyers et al. 2008; Lowery et al. 2015) because of a concern that 
imbalances might increase due to the complexity of EU multilevel politics. The 
existing literature demonstrates that EU level lobbying requires more resources than 
national lobbying which biases political participation towards more resourceful 
groups. But empirical studies also suggest that the EU consultation regime and the 
Commission’s invitation practices to its expert groups effectively contain the potential 
bias in favour of business (Bunea 2017; Rasmussen and Gross 2015). Moreover, 
contrary to common perceptions, the contributors to the special issue demonstrate that 
the EU level interest group population resembles the populations of interest groups in 
the member states (Berkhout et al. 2017, in this issue), when controlling, inter alia, for 
policy domains. The authors point out that a strong presence of business associations 
is a characteristic feature of the populations at both levels. They also suggest that 
business interest associations may have a larger representative capacity than other 
group types. In that respect, Kohler-Koch et al. (2017, in this issue) find that domestic 
business interest associations (BIA) representing a larger share of their potential 
membership are more likely to have both access (rather than not) to the European 
Parliament and more frequent contacts with the Commission than BIAs that are less 
representative. Another contribution studies the population density of national interest 
groups in the EU focusing on their presence in the European Parliament (Carroll and 
Rasmussen 2017, in this issue). The authors find that countries with a higher number 
of national interest groups per MEP are among the oldest members of the EU, 
underlining that a tradition of national interest group mobilization may be a source of 
bias. This interpretation is held up by their finding that the presence of national groups 
in the EP is significantly affected by the associational culture prevalent within the 
country of origin.  
 
The articles in this special issue are indicative of the move from case studies towards theory-
based large-N studies in EU and comparative interest group research. Several contributions 
(Eising et al 2017, Eising 2017; Carroll and Rasmussen 2017, all in this issue) build on the 
INTEREURO project, 1  in which issue-based (top-down) sampling served to study, from 
different perspectives, legislative lobbying on EU directive and regulation proposals for the 
population of organizations that were active on these proposals. Another large-scale project 
they draw on is the EUROLOB II project (Kohler-Koch et al 2017, in this issue),2 which 
analyses the strategies of British, German, French and Polish interest groups in EU policy-
making on the basis of the bottom-up sampling of national interest group directories. Marshall 
and Bernhagen (2017, in this issue) use data collected within the Borderless Politics project,3 
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which analyses the political and social strategies of large business firms around the world. 
Other contributions are based on comprehensive surveys, web-site analyses, and content 
analyses scrutinizing the EU impact on domestic interest organizations. Each article employs 
state-of-the-art research techniques and adapts them to the needs of interest group research. In 
line with the broadening of the field in recent years, the authors’ findings are not only relevant 
to EU interest group studies but address also the literatures on multilevel governance, policy-
making, Europeanization, and political representation in the EU, deepening our understanding 
of the functioning of advanced democracies and multilevel governance in Europe.  
 
An overview of the individual contributions 
The special issue is divided in three parts. The first section presents research on alignments of 
national interest organizations. The first contribution analyses how the alignments and 
arguments of domestic interest groups impact on their participation in national and EU level 
consultations on EU policies. The study covers interest organizations in the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, and the UK (Eising et al.2017, in this issue). The authors test 
new hypotheses on the linkage between arguments and positional as well as ideological 
alignments and the national groups’ strategic representation. Drawing on original data from 
research on 20 EU directive proposals that were tabled between 2008 and 2010 by the 
European Commission, they use a large-N study in which they include elaborate 
operationalisations of country and policy contexts, as well as group types. The authors 
provide evidence that alignments, positional and ideological, and arguments leave an imprint 
on the participation of domestic interests in consultations on EU policies. They identify four 
varieties of interest representation routines in response to different alignment patterns and 
conclude that the role of alignments and arguments cannot be neglected anymore in the 
analysis of political access and venue shopping in EU policy-making.  
 
The second contribution in that section explores the lobbying strategies of large firms in 
EU policy-making (Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, in this issue). In detail, the authors focus 
on large companies from Germany and Great Britain and investigate how their in-house 
lobbyists’ perceptions of government-business relations and national systems of interest 
representation shape the firms’ strategies in the multilevel system. They show that perceived 
conflict between firms and public authorities at the national level as well as greater conflict at 
the national level than at EU level increase corporate lobbying at the EU level. The authors 
also find that national types of interest intermediation shape relative corporate engagement at 
the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue. Thereby, Marshall and 
Bernhagen contribute to studies which provide evidence that national institutional contexts 
continues to shape business political behaviour in the multilevel EU system, but in more 
complex ways than have been previously considered. Combined with the findings of Eising et 
al. (2017, in this issue) and Wonka (2017, in this issue), we see that alignments between 
decision-makers and interest groups must not be neglected when studying the interest groups’ 
venue choices and relations with EU level groups. 
 
Shifting the perspective to the policy-makers, Wonka (2017, in this issue) studies in detail 
the relations between members of the German parliament (Bundestag) and interest groups on 
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issues related to EU policy-making. He situates their interactions in the context of the MPs’ 
intra-party information exchanges and provides evidence putting into question exchange-
access theories. Moving away from the idea that information is a scarce resource for 
parliamentarians, Wonka provides evidence that information gathering strategies of MPs in 
EU policy-making are systematically shaped by partisan ideologies and electoral incentives. 
Rather than screening diverse information delivered by a plethora of interest organizations, 
legislators strengthen the ties with those groups that are part of their core constituency and 
broadly share their political views. Here in particular, Wonka finds that the model of 
information provision as a subsidy developed by Hall and Deardorff (2006) for the US 
context holds also for European policy-making in the German Bundestag. Wonka’s 
contribution fills several research gaps, starting with an important new data set from the 
perspective of politicians to his findings on information provision and ideological alignments. 
 
Finally, building on Hirschman’s distinction of loyalty, exit and voice strategies, Eising 
(2017, in this issue) studies the performance of EU level interest groups with respect to their 
two core functions: the provision of policy information to their members and the formation of 
a common position to represent them in EU policy-making. Suggesting that full exit from EU 
level groups is highly uncommon, he develops the category of selective exit to characterise 
the strategies of national interest organizations in response to a poor performance of EU 
associations. According to his findings, national members resort to voice within the EU level 
groups and engage in coalitions and media debates outside them to counteract performance 
failures. In contrast to conventional wisdom, misalignments of national members’ preferences 
with EU level groups’ common positions do not leave an imprint on the members’ usage of 
inside strategies at national and EU levels. 
 
The second section highlights the relevance of Europeanization and the corresponding 
access of national interest organizations to political institutions in the EU multilevel system. 
Kohler et al. (2017, in this issue) focus on the access of business interest associations (BIA) to 
state institutions in Germany, Poland, France, the UK, and at EU level. The article compares 
the contact patterns of BIAs to national institutions with those to EU institutions, 
differentiating between executive and legislative institutions and between top level politicians 
and bureaucrats at the working level. The authors further examine which factors explain 
similarities and differences in the selection of targets and the frequency of contacts. 
Broadening Bouwen’s (2002) exchange-access model of interest intermediation in the EU, 
they provide evidence that more financial resources, greater mobilization of potential 
members, and a wider sectoral scope tend to promote access. Contrary to earlier studies, the 
authors demonstrate that the economic importance of national sectors is not relevant to the 
access of BIAs to policy-makers.  
 
Cekik (2017, in this issue) asks how interest organizations outside the EU (Macedonia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro) have responded to the challenge of EU accession and their level of 
Europeanization. Using survey data, she studies the interest groups’ involvement in the EU 
accession process: groups’ activities at the national level related to EU accession, their 
membership in EU level associations, and contacts with EU institutions. As explanatory 
12 
 
factors, she considers the groups’ access to national institutions in domestic politics, their 
resources, the Europeanization of policy areas and the groups’ dependence on EU funding. 
Cekik finds that these factors account for interest groups’ levels of Europeanization, while 
variations across group types are insignificant. Her article fills an important research gap by 
analysing the role of interest organizations from EU accession countries, which have been 
overlooked for many years. In addition, she finds that national context characteristics as well 
as organisational structures like membership and access strategies account better for the 
Europeanization of groups than their type of interest which contradicts the findings on group 
type effects in established EU member states. 
 
In the third contribution to this section, Tatham (2017, in this issue) explores the effects of 
organisational factors and domestic contexts on regional interest representation in the EU. The 
particular significance of his article for this special issue is an expansion of traditional 
understandings of interest representation to regional representations at the European level. 
These are rarely included in interest representation studies. Based on novel survey data for 
more than 100 regional offices, Tatham explores their roles and activities at the EU level. He 
seeks to account for their activities by linking them to office-level, regional and domestic 
contextual factors in a series of multilevel models. His results point out that younger regional 
representations are more geared at obtaining funding information and building ties with other 
regions than at engaging in legislative lobbying when compared to older, more established 
regional representations. His results show that a greater extent of self-rule in the region of 
origin is associated with a greater engagement in legislative lobbying at EU level. While 
many activities of the regional offices in Brussels are certainly geared at interest 
representation in the EU, the author cautions that supranational mobilisation by domestic 
actors is not always aimed at obtaining policy influence. 
 
The third and final section addresses the important question of representational bias 
existing within the population of interest organizations. Berkhout et al. (2017: in this issue) 
analyse how the EU’s population of interest organizations compares with those in EU member 
states. They explore a potential bias towards business representatives in the EU interest group 
population as well as the representational capacity of the organizations in the EU and national 
populations. The authors compare for the first time the EU level interest group population 
with those in France, Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, thus performing a 
comparison across distinct governance levels, European vs national. They also account for 
different aspects of the diversity within the distinct interest group populations. The results 
show that the EU interest group population does not differ significantly from the national 
interest group populations, when controlling for other explanations such as policy domains, 
bringing new insights to studies on the EU interest group population ecology. This finding 
challenges accounts that see the EU as a special case, or characterize the EU interest group 
population as being uniquely biased towards business organizations. 
 
Carroll and Rasmussen (2017, in this issue) present a comprehensive study of the 
population of national interest groups lobbying the European Parliament (EP). In the first part 
of their analysis, the authors place the absolute number of organized interests in relation to 
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different benchmarks such as the size of the national economy, population size, and the 
number of country seats in the EP. In the second part, they investigate how differences in 
domestic contexts condition the representation of national interest groups in the EP. Here, 
they take into account hitherto neglected national cultural resources (understood as the 
national associational culture). Their results show that countries with large levels of citizen 
activism have a larger number of groups present in the European Parliament, adding to studies 
that concentrate on national economic resources as a source of mobilisation. More generally, 
these findings enhance our understanding of how specific aspects of domestic contexts relate 
to the access of domestic interest organizations to EU institutions. 
 
In sum, this special issue is a further step in the progression of comparative and EU interest 
group studies towards a field characterized by the systematic empirical testing of propositions 
derived from mid-range theories. With its focus on national interest groups in the EU 
multilevel system, it highlights a theoretically and empirically neglected research subject. 
Finally, it presents novel developments in the study of political alignments among interest 
groups and political institutions, the Europeanization of domestic interest organizations, and 
the question of bias in interest group populations.  
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Table 1 Major characteristics of the contributions 
 
Authors Samp-
ling  
Levels  Countries  Type of 
interest 
organi-
sation 
Main RI: 
Alignments 
and venues 
Main RI: 
Access and 
Europeaniza-
tion 
Main RI:  
Bias in 
interest 
represent-
tation  
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Eising, 
Rasch, Roz-
bicka, Fink-
Hafner, 
Hafner-
Fink, Novak 
Top 
down 
EU and 
national 
Germany, Nether-
lands, Slovenia, 
Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Various Positional and 
ideological 
alignments 
  Participation in 
national and EU 
level policy 
consultations 
Marshall 
and 
Bernhagen 
Bottom 
Up 
EU and 
national 
Germany, United 
Kingdom 
Large 
firms 
Conflict levels 
in the relation 
with domestic 
and EU policy-
makers 
  Proportion of EU 
lobbying time 
relative to overall 
lobbying time 
Wonka Bottom 
Up 
(Sample 
of MPs) 
National Germany Various Ideological 
alignments 
  Information ex-
change between 
MPs and interest 
groups 
Eising Top 
Down 
EU Germany, Nether-
lands, Slovenia, 
Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Various Positional align-
ments and per-
formance gaps 
of EU level 
groups 
  National mem-
bers’ strategies 
outside EU level 
groups 
Kohler-
Koch, 
Kotzian, 
Bottom 
up 
EU and 
national 
Germany, France, 
Poland, United 
Kingdom 
Business 
interest 
associ-
 Access of 
business interest 
associations 
 Access to nation-
al and EU level 
institutions 
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and 
Quittkat 
ations 
Cekik Bottom 
up 
EU and 
national 
Macedonia, 
Montenegro, 
Serbia 
Various  Europeaniza-
tion of interest 
organisations in 
accession 
countries 
 Importance of and 
access to national 
and EU 
institutions; 
Membership in 
EU level groups 
Tatham Top 
Down 
EU and 
national 
Regional actors 
from 20 countries 
Regions  Representation 
of regional 
interests 
 Activities (e.g. 
lobbying, liaison, 
funding) of re-
gional offices in 
Brussels 
Berkhout, 
Hanegraaff 
and Braun 
Bottom 
up 
EU and 
national 
Germany, France, 
Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, 
European Union 
Various   Bias in interest 
group 
populations 
Composition and 
representational 
characteristics of 
EU and member 
states’ interest 
group populations 
Carroll and 
Rasmussen 
Top 
down 
EU All EU member 
states 
Various   Bias in the 
population of 
national interest 
groups present 
in the EP 
Absolute and 
relative popu-
lation density  
Note: RI = research interest 
                                                          
1 www.intereuro.eu  
2 http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/d7/en/projects/eurolob-ii-europeanization-of-interest-intermediation  
3 http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/borderlesspolitics/ 
